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Abstract 
The Critical Infrastructures (CI) that provide essential services such as energy, water and transport 
have been undergoing a digital transformation to achieve more effective and efficient operations. 
These changes are increasing the potential attack surface and exposure to cybersecurity incidents. 
The EU Directive on Security of Network and Information Systems (NIS Directive) (National Cyber 
Security Centre, 2018) has brought a new emphasis on improving the cybersecurity of essential 
services. It has introduced mandatory incident reporting and a framework to raise the cybersecurity 
and resilience levels of CI.    
Rather than a dislocated approach to managing the system in parts, taking on responsibility for 
cybersecurity requires an integrated, whole-system governance approach, to discover the full end-to-
end picture and risk assess the potential gaps in security. The NIS Directive expects cybersecurity to 
be managed through the wider system of contractors and sub-contractors and vendors to the sector, 
all participating in a complex adaptive system. From whole organisations down to products, 
components and data flows, deciding the scope of critical systems that support essential services has 
integrated activity across different work areas such as operational technologies, enterprise IT and 
telecoms networks. Understanding the end-to-end system and whole enterprise interactions is 
necessary to achieve the outcome-based nature of the NIS Directive.  
This paper investigates the activities that have evolved to secure the broader and deeper supply chains 
as well as internal networks and systems of CI organisations. Enterprise Systems Engineering (ESE) is 
introduced as a tool to facilitate the shared cybersecurity requirements across organisations for 
securing essential services, streamlining whole system security behaviours of people, processes and 
technology towards a more resilient CI. 
Introduction 
The NIS Directive was transposed into UK law in May 2018. It requires operators of essential services 
to manage their cybersecurity risks and protect against cyber-attack, while increasing their ability to 
detect cybersecurity events and minimise the impact of incidents. The NIS Directive also expects an 
understanding and management of the cybersecurity risks presented by tiers of supply chains. 
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“An enterprise is a complex, socio-technical system that comprises interdependent resources of 
people, information and technology that must interact with each other and their environment in 
support of a common mission” (Giachetti, 2010). Systems Engineering addresses complex technical 
systems with many stakeholders. ESE adapts the Systems Engineering concept to socio-technical 
systems including a significant human aspect. Rather than being for single projects, ESE is a continuous 
process due to enterprises constantly evolving (White and Rebovich, 2011). The systems approach 
allows a process to unfold and encourages adaptability to an evolving situation. Decisions are 
informed by the set of relationships between interdependent actors (Jackson, 2003). ESE involves 
aligning all the small developments across the enterprise to contribute to the purpose of a whole 
enterprise (Giachetti, 2010). 
There is a vast array of issues affecting the cybersecurity of our CI that involve technology, people, 
processes and organisations. This paper presents ESE as an approach to align the achievements so far 
to improve the cybersecurity of CI. Guiding whole system influences, towards a common purpose of a 
more resilient, cybersecure system, requires agreed actions and shared accountability within a 
performance framework to chart progress. The application of ESE methods demonstrates how the 
interactions and combined efforts of multiple organisations can direct participation in a complex 
adaptive system and achieve the outcome of improved cybersecurity levels. In this paper, the term 
‘Enterprise’ will refer to the combined endeavour involving both public and private actors to improve 
cybersecurity. In particular it refers to the collaborations and partnerships that have evolved with a 
vision to improve cybersecurity across interdependent activities. This analysis is based on the author’s 
interviews and discussions with industry and government, on participation in cybersecurity Public-
Private Partnerships (PPP) as well as on academic literature.  
The NIS Directive 
The NIS Directive has established a communication structure among private and public organisations 
to support improving the cybersecurity capability of essential services. Implementing the NIS Directive 
has introduced the following roles:  
• Operators of Essential Services (OES) are implementing the NIS Principles and are required to 
report incidents affecting essential services to the Competent Authority. 
• Competent Authorities (CA) produce sector specific guidance and are required to audit and 
assess the cybersecurity levels achieved by OES in their sector. 
• Computer Security Incident Response Team (CSIRT) provides technical expertise and 
assistance with cybersecurity incidents.  
• Single Point of Contact (SPOC) engages with EU partners and participates in the NIS 
Cooperation Group to further international cooperation. 
In the UK, the National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) performs the role of CSIRT and SPOC as well as 
offering advice and guidance to OES and CA in tailoring NIS requirements to each sector (NCSC, 2019a). 
NIS assumes responsibility on individual OES to take appropriate measures to secure their supply chain 
where their essential service is dependent on a third-party product or service. This has proved 
problematic as individual OES often have little negotiating power to ensure their security 
requirements are met, especially where the choice of suppliers is limited. In addition, OES have limited 
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visibility of their supply chain beyond tier 1 suppliers to really know and manage their supply chain 
risks (Wallis and Johnson, 2020).  
A response is required beyond organisational boundaries, with contributions from multiple owners 
and accountability to cybersecurity. Figure 1 shows an individual OES having control over some aspects 
of the system to be secured and needing to use their influence, as far as they can, to negotiate the 
required security for other aspects of the system. Cyber maturity assessments that focus on this area 
of control rest on a relatively narrow evidence base without considering dependencies across 
extended supply chains. Cybersecurity often entails a sharing of risk that requires a collective effort to 
mitigate (Christensen and Petersen, 2017). The area of influence in Figure 1 includes OES engagement 
with other organisations tasked with NIS responsibilities and includes their relations with suppliers to 
negotiate security requirements. The area outside OES control includes the changing threat landscape, 
the many unknowns in cybersecurity and areas where an OES has limited visibility, such as sub-
contracting processes or components used in devices and systems. The potential sphere of influence 
can be expanded through the collaborative effort of stakeholders to contribute to understanding the 
latest threat landscape, reducing vulnerabilities and minimising the impact of incidents (Wallis and 
Johnson, 2020). ESE offers a synthesis by looking at the problem of securing an OES within the context 
of its containing whole, hence making the solution space larger (Rebovich, 2005).  
 
Figure 1 OES areas of influence and control 
There have been a multitude of adaptations to implement the NIS related initiatives. This paper 
considers the overall enterprise of activity as a collaboration of several organisations to develop 
cybersecurity capability and support the delivery of essential services. “Proper management of the 
enterprise and extended enterprise increases resilience” (Madni and Boehm, 2017). The whole 
‘enterprise’ of influence being considered includes: 
• OES. 
• Suppliers directly contracted by an OES. 
• ‘Extended’ enterprise of supply chain activity. 
• Government departments guiding the cybersecurity improvements of each sector. 
• Collaborations and partnerships sharing best practice information for each industry sector.  
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Managing Complexity 
The complexity of the whole system reduces an individual OES’ ability to control and direct the 
required outcomes of the NIS Directive. Improving their ability to influence the outcomes would help 
to manage the complexity and achieve more holistic improvements in cybersecurity. Exploring what 
it means to comply with the NIS Directive has resulted in a proliferation of approaches to the problem, 
displayed by the horizontal axis in Figure 2. While each OES acknowledges a similar need for 
cybersecurity, their response to that need can be quite different, depending on existing capability and 
the risk appetite of each organisation. Negotiating cybersecurity requirements of suppliers has been 
challenging for individual OES, they have looked to a more uniform approach to collectively negotiate 
alongside other OES their expectations on suppliers, represented by the vertical axis in Figure 2. When 
a circle of control is relatively small, balancing differentiation and integration in a complementary way 
can achieve the best outcomes. The NIS implementation has enabled OES to seek a balance of actions 
for efficiency and order with effective adaptation to the environment (Swarz and DeRosa, 2006).  
 
Figure 2 Balancing Complexity with Order 
Emergence of Trusted Partnerships 
There are key and potentially complementary differences in focus between government and private 
sector cybersecurity requirements. From a government perspective there is a need to assure the 
cybersecurity of essential services that are provided over privately owned CI. Government interest 
tends towards defence of the nation and the attribution of perpetrating actors. Their view is more 
outwardly focussed towards threats from other states or state-sponsored actors. Conversely the 
private sector is more inward looking and focussed on vulnerabilities. Their attention is on the 
inevitability of cybersecurity risks and balancing those alongside other business risks. A private actor’s 
inward view is to detect, mitigate and foster their ability to recover from attack. Awareness of a 
company’s reputational risk has also brought more emphasis to cybersecurity preparedness. 
Embracing the diverse perspectives of public and private sector participants, could bring “many 
different threat realities and approaches” to the table (Christensen and Petersen, 2017). 
The concept of cybersecurity as a shared mission and the reality that “no single management entity 
has control over the whole” (Swarz and DeRosa, 2006) has encouraged Public-Private Partnerships 
(PPP) or Information Sharing and Analysis Centres (ISAC) to form, enabling government and industry 
to work together. An enabling ‘enterprise’ is already emerging from combined efforts across industry 
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and through such trusted partnerships. There would be a massive overhead of cost and time for each 
OES to attend to the cybersecurity of their entire supply chain, with thousands of suppliers and testing 
of all components being unachievable (Madni and Boehm, 2017). Instead, for example, a group of OES 
are collaborating to discuss their common security requirements and meeting with suppliers to discuss 
requirements that can be built into suppliers’ offerings, rather than cybersecurity add-ons being sold 
separately to each OES (Wallis, 2020).  
A wider participation of both public and private actors in this task would aid a more balanced 
intervention by government (McCarthy, 2018). Reducing risks to acceptable levels depends on the risk 
appetite of each individual entity. The capability to achieve NIS outcomes is upheld by an entity’s 
business interests and goals. Governments need to achieve an acceptable security level for their 
nation from a mix of different private sector responses to the risks. An ESE approach can be used as a 
tool to find common ground, as well as understand the differing requirements, to design how to work 
together, understand and integrate the different requirements of business and government. This 
would allow a broad and flexible understanding of the shared risks enabling a continuous adaptation 
“to the benefit of both the individual partners and the common good” (Christensen and Petersen, 
2017).  
PPPs in cybersecurity have been shown to be based on more than a strategic self-interest and 
management of reputational risk. There is a social glue that binds these partnerships with professional 
loyalty, founded by higher moral principles. This gives a subtle power of commitment and loyalty to 
these partnerships that goes beyond simple strategic interests. Embracing the different perspectives 
from diverse participation also gives value to the PPP. Such partnerships bring “a commitment to 
future commitments” (Christensen and Petersen, 2017) often through voluntary contribution and 
going beyond immediate results without specifying outcomes. This commitment requires:  
• Openness and trust. 
• Shared understanding of risks/threats requiring mitigation through collective effort. 
• Collaboration for new solutions to a common purpose. 
• Long term relations (Christensen and Petersen, 2017). 
Tasking CA, NCSC and OES with NIS responsibilities has established a “trust anchor” (Distelrath, 2019) 
for incident reporting and a collaborative operational responsibility to support the protection of 
systems operated by OES. The use of a trusted intermediary has proven to be particularly effective in 
anonymising and normalising information, to establish a risk picture for the energy sector and identify 
areas where a combined approach offers more scope for progressing issues (Wallis, 2020). The Energy 
Networks Association (ENA) provided cybersecurity procurement guidance through a collaboration of 
government, vendors and operators (ENA, 2016). Also, the idea of a common assurance framework is 
evolving to achieve a more cost-effective balance between variety and commonality in the system. 
Such partnerships and collaborations provide an important foundation to assemble and discuss the 
requirements of government and the private sector. Facilitation through ESE prioritises the 
interconnectedness and dependencies because the design extends across organisations to achieve the 
required capability, while acknowledging the limits to cooperation where interests of government and 
private actors are more disparate.   
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Shaping Interactions 
To progress the ESE concept from Figure 2 of balancing complexity with order, Figure 3 illustrates 
interactions patterns shaping the selection of strategy or best practice from the varied approaches 
arising from different NIS implementations (Swarz and DeRosa, 2006). Trusted partnerships such as 
PPPs or ISACs can provide a context to shape interactions and direction, with awareness of the whole 
set of public private interests. This provides a context for the required behaviour, creating the space 
to modify behaviours through awareness (Koop and Lodge, 2017). The selection of best 
practices/solutions need to be based on local considerations as well as the CI system as a whole.  
 
Figure 3 Shaping interactions to discover and implement best practices (Rebovich, 2005) 
The NCSC have provided a Cyber Assessment Framework (CAF) from the NIS outcomes (NCSC, 2019b). 
The CAF acts as a “shared image” and “common perception” for all components in the Enterprise to 
adhere to (Swarz and DeRosa, 2006). The CAF was originally provided to support the implementation 
of the NIS Directive by OES. It has since been expanded for a wider user base to be applied to other 
parts of CI and to cyber related safety risks. From this CAF the CA for each sector has decided on 
baseline targets and an outline approach per sector. This has enabled a range of methods to be trialled 
at the CA level. The CAF profile is providing a target state per sector for the system to work towards.  
Rather than a prescriptive approach, the NIS outcomes give the OES a choice in how they manage 
their own risks. The OES complete a self-assessment and produce their own cyber security 
improvement plans. This has also triggered a variety of approaches by OES in how they achieve the 
NIS outcomes (Wallis, 2019).  
There is a verification activity by CA as they audit OES against their self-assessments and improvement 
plans. CA are also offering improved guidance to OES to support weaker areas. There have been 
investigations into dependencies on common suppliers and components to discover where there is a 
requirement for greater diversity of technology for a more resilient infrastructure. However, a 
diversity of vendors may not improve resilience if their products share common components and 
vulnerabilities (Wallis, 2020). 
The progression of the Enterprise pictured in Figure 3 is exemplified through the activity of assessing 
the current state of the system against a target state to expand the existing set of capabilities: 
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• Current state, decided through OES self-assessment. 
• Target state, NIS principles and CAF profile setting baseline expectations for each sector. 
• Gap in capability, identified in OES Improvement Plans, audited by CA.  
The practice of ESE can facilitate an integrated set of organisations, understand their roles and 
responsibilities, to foster an environment in which cybersecurity capability can emerge. A synthesis of 
knowledge and experience from different stakeholders, and integration of the multi-dimensional 
aspects is crucial to improve the cybersecurity performance of industry (Hoogervorst, 2009). 
Enterprise Engineering a complex adaptive system 
The inability of OES as individual entities to make progress with securing global supply chains requires 
a collaborative intervention from public-private partnerships. The task is too vast for individual 
organisations to resolve using varied approaches. It requires a balance between a more uniform 
approach to meet common needs and requirements while retaining the ability to form bespoke 
solutions for specific deployments by different OES (Wallis, 2019).  
To improve the cybersecurity capability of the whole system requires a shared understanding of the 
threats to give a context of scenarios to prepare for. A combined effort in this regard can be more 
effective and efficient. The gathering of knowledge through incident reporting to CAs will provide “a 
more comprehensive view of the current threat landscape” (Christensen and Petersen, 2017). Private 
companies are interested in the knowledge compiled by government where it can be shared to assist 
preparations. OES can be caught in the crossfire of attacks that were targeted elsewhere when they 
carry the same product vulnerabilities in their infrastructure (Wallis, 2020).  
Beyond post incident analysis, potential earlier alerting to the latest threats has been proposed by the 
Network Code on Cybersecurity (Distelrath, 2019). Cyber threats against CI require information 
sharing and collaborative partnership “to improve the volume, timeliness, and quality of shared cyber 
threat information” (Madni and Boehm, 2017). Multiple perspectives are required to maintain 
awareness of the environment, to gather the latest threat picture and anticipate preparations. 
Adaptability to this dynamic situation requires (Madni and Boehm, 2017): 
• Self-awareness, enabled by the NIS self-assessment and improvement plans. 
• Context awareness, knowing the latest threat scenarios to prepare for. 
• Shared awareness, shared risks requiring a collective effort to mitigate.  
• Maintain awareness, through combined governance and oversight. 
While risks are somewhat shared through collaborations or transferred through outsourcing, the 
private sector entity owning the assets and providing the essential service retains the liability. Where 
NIS outcomes cannot be achieved by an individual OES working alone, ESE offers a tool to coordinate 
and facilitate the ecosystem of private sector capability across multiple organisations, to understand 
fully what the requirements of government and private sector are in cybersecurity of CI and how to 
achieve them, by individual OES or sector collaborations. 
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Conclusion 
The process of NIS implementation has mobilised some collaborations to more effectively work 
towards the outcomes required by the NIS Directive. This has highlighted the importance of 
partnership to achieve cybersecurity across dynamic and extended boundaries. An ESE approach adds 
to this by enabling continuous changes to be managed to adapt the enterprise towards meeting new 
threats, facilitating a continual redesign of the enterprise to respond to the latest cybersecurity 
challenges (Giachetti, 2010).  
NIS implementation and cybersecurity improvements need to be embodied within a form of 
enterprise governance to acknowledge the socio-technical dynamics and to organise adaptations to 
the evolving threats and risks. (Hoogervorst, 2009) (Koop and Lodge, 2017). The application of ESE 
concepts can provide a more joined-up approach to resolving and implementing an improved 
cybersecurity level for CI. Rather than traditional systems engineering thoroughly specifying system 
elements, ESE can hold an integrated, constantly evolving entity to enable the required capability to 
emerge (White and Rebovich, 2011). This cybersecurity case study provides a basis for further 
development and could also be usefully applied to other socio-technical enterprises undergoing 
change. 
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